Even the harshest enemies of India and its military (that would be Pakistan and China, both have fought wars against India) will not claim that the Indian military acts outside the chain of command.

This is a testament to the democratic principles practiced by the armed services in the world’s largest democracy.

India’s border security force (BSF) is not part of the Indian Military–it is under the purview of Ministry of Home Affairs, and is considered a law enforcement agency.

The Daily Star and other newspapers are reporting:

Bangladesh Rifles and the Indian Border Security Force traded gunfire for around three hours yesterday after BSF crossed the Jaintapur border in Sylhet and shot locals.

At least 15 villagers were injured in the BSF firing, reports our staff correspondent from Sylhet.

The BDR and BSF jawans fired more than a thousand shots, forcing the villagers to flee their homes, said eyewitnesses.

The skirmish took place a day after BSF intruded into Bangladesh, dug bunkers and retreated following a flag meeting.

Only three days back, the Indian frontier force assured their Bangladesh counterpart of no more killing of villagers in the bordering areas. The assurance came when directors general of the two forces met in New Delhi.

Some 40 Indian Khasia people entered the Bangladesh territory through Muktapur-Jaintapur at around 10:30am.

An hour later, they were joined by a hundred more. Backed by the Indian border guards, they soon began erecting bamboo huts at Mandir Tila, about 300 yards off the no-man’s land.

As they refused to leave on repeated requests from the villagers, a brawl ensued. Hurling stones, the two sides chased each other for an hour.
…
Talking to The Daily Star last night, BDR Director General Major Gen Md Mainul Islam termed the incident “very regretful”.

He said the BSF stopped firing after BDR had contacted the Indian side.

He observed the decisions taken at the recent director general-level meet do not seem to have been communicated to the BSF officials at the grassroots level.

Really? A DG-level meeting directive has not filtered down to the sector commanders on the Indian side? So is it possible that the BSF, a much smaller force than the Indian military, has a broken chain of communication and/or is actively defying its political masters and even its own director general?

Given the history and culture of Indian armed forces, it is not just unlikely, it is impossible.

Which leads me to the conclusion that the incursion inside Bangladesh and shooting at unarmed civilians by BSF occurred with an informed consent or even a direct order from India’s government.

In short, India’s prime minister and the home minister has the blood of innocent Bangladeshis on their hands.

I have no idea why India is doing this to a friendly government that poses no threat to India (unlike the BNP government that actively patronised Indian insurgents). I do not have to understand India’s motivation to condemn it.

But what is worse is the pussyfooting on Bangladesh’s part. Where is the report about the foreign ministry asking the Indian envoy to explain his nation’s actions? Where is the protest? Oh–I guess those did not happen.

Friendship with India is a necessity for Bangladesh. But it must be based on mutual trust, respect and understanding, not one-way murder of Bangladeshi people by India.

One of our recent posts, Accountability and Distorted Truths” generated many comments on Shadakalo and E-Bangladesh that also merit space on the front page.

Where email addresses were provided, we tried to to communicate with the commenters but in vain; looks like all of them provided fake email addresses so the emails bounced.

We thought we would respond en masse, and at the same time [a] acknowledge valid points and [b] refute obviously incorrect or untrue comments. The comments are in a shaded box, followed by our response.

As this post was being written, we came across this piece of news that we hope you will agree supports our position. The news is simple: Army officers on deputation to BDR are resisting going to their duty post, and instead asking to be transferred back to the regular Army.

From Ittefaq:

You are picking a fight where one does not exist. Since you can write English, I assume you can read it too. I suggest you go back and read what I wrote.

But what exactly do you mean by “don’t cross the limit”? Is that a threat? I guess it burns you up that the “bloody civilians” are questioning the Army’s motive–the Army whose officers have so far killed two sitting presidents of the country.

Also, allow me to ask another question.

Are you saying you actually think retired officers should have a role in the running of the current Army?

Perhaps by now you have heard the audio of the dialog between Sheikh Hasina and some Army officers. If so, you have heard Lt. Col. Syed Kamruzzaman yelling about Maj. Gen. (rtd) Tarek Siddik’s role in promotion and posting. I happen to agree with Lt. Col. Kamruzzaman about curtailing the role of retired officers.

Do you?

Dear Sir or Madam: Unless you claim you know more about warefare than the retired Brigadier General whom I quoted, you are a poser, and have no right to make the claims you did.

But lets leave that behind for now, and concentrate on your comment, “Haven’t you seen or heard of hostage rescue ioperation [sic] all over the world?”

Yes, I have. But you don’t have to believe my claims. I will direct you to this thesis by a US Army Major on Hostage Rescue, titled “ANATOMY OF A HOSTAGE RESCUE: WHAT MAKES HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS SUCCESSFUL?”

Just so you don’t think this is an academic talking, the author states: “I have personally been involved with tracking some of these AMCITS (american citizens-SK) and trying to recover them.” Remember that this is a serving officer writing his thesis for a Navy post graduate school, someone with personal knowledge about “modern warfare” that you allege to know so much about.

I quote:

“The principles of hostage rescue operations presented in this thesis and used in the biorhythm model—surprise, intelligence, operator’s skill, and deception—are derived from looking at numerous planning models from special operations, from personal experience, and the thorough analysis of six historical cases. The historical cases show that in every instance any one of these four principles was overlooked, the operation was doomed.”

I know for a fact, based on conversations with serving Army officers, that Bangladesh Army has not trained in Hostage rescue operations before, but that is going to change now. Perhaps you care to enlighted us how, without any practice or skill, and ZERO
surprise, how this operation was going to be successful without getting the hostages killed in the process? (even if you ignore the “bloody civilians”)

Also, you are blatantly ignoring the rest of the country. We know there are confirmed reports of the BDR taking up arms in Shatkania training facility, Khulna and Sylhet. We know all Army officers had by then fled from their commands. On March 9, an Army officer reported to the new DG of BDR that:

“At a battalion outside Dhaka some soldiers took arms from the armoury to attack the officers following rumours of military attack on the jawans,” said an officer who left his office outside Dhaka on security grounds on February 26 and has not returned yet.

Like this officer, other officers are also afraid of going back without one platoon of Army soldiers to those areas. So my dear arm-chair general, answer me this: if 10 days after the so-called mutiny Army officers are afraid to go back among the BDRs in other districts, you think on the day of the rebellion the BDRs would have just sat back and let their fellow BDRs be over-run by the Army?

Don’t give me a line about cutting off the mobile network. BDR has its own radio network, and its own Telephone network.

Even cutting off the radio network wasn’t enough; if the BDRs at, say Sylhet, could not communicate with the rebels in Dhaka, they would know something was wrong.

Lastly, ‘Barishallya Logic’–I am not sure what it is but since Sher-E-Bangla was from Barishal and a great debater, I think you meant that as a complement.

Yes. God Bless.

Great questions. Allow me to answer where I know the answer.

1. Read the paper linked on the above response. The author is a Major in the
US Army, and based on his case study and personal experience, he does NOT mention superior force as a success factor.

As a matter of fact, if you think back to Antebbe and all the other successful operations,
the hallmark always been through a surprise attack by a very highly skilled small team, not superior force.

Hasina stated that the Army chief told her it will take time to position tanks and other heavy weapons. Since even the most vocal critics at Shenakunjo did not dispute that, I am assuming that was true. Do you agree?

BDR did not fall apart because of the tanks/APCs getting there on the 26th; they were there on the 25th as well.

2. Which “procedure” is this? Seriously, enlighten me. BDR is under the home ministry,
and the Army has no role in its running or quelling of the Mutiny beyond what the government asks it to do. When Army officers are sent to BDR, they become BDR officers, outside the chain of command of the Army. This is a basic fact.

3. First, BDRs were shooting at the Army. If not the politicians, the Army could not negotiate with fire coming at them. Who else was going to go in and negotiate? University professors? Doctors?

Please cite one newspaper report showing the Army was asked to move back 3km. Civilians were asked to move back 3KM as a preparation for the final assault, not the Army. One of my relative’s house is about 300 yards away from gate 2, and their garage became an Army camp, like all neighboring houses.

Go back and read some newspapers–there are hundreds of photo showing Army right outside the walls on day 1.

4. I am not sure I understand. The “Truth”, whatever it is, can NOT destroy the country. However, Lies can, and will, destroy to country. If you are saying the media
broadcast the BDR lies, I am with you 100%. At the very least, they needed to report both sides of the story equally

5. I don’t know. Perhaps you can ask the Media. Since DGFI actually approves who gets to go on talk shows these days, perhaps you can also ask DGFI about the people
on various talk-shows.

6. Do you seriously believe it would have been safe for the officers if one ventured out from hiding to talk to her?

TV cameras showed her being escorted by armed BDR personnel. If she tried to talk to an Army officer, his life would have been in danger. I guess then we could blame her
even more? On the night of the 25th, Sahara Khatun left Pilkhana with at least one injured Army officer. At Shenakunjo, Sheikh Hasina described how the BDRs guarding the gate
were ready to shoot him, and Sahara Khatun convinced them to allow him to leave. Are you saying after this officer was safely out of BDR, no one asked him what
was going on, or he did not volunteer any information? If you still believe that, no logic will convince you. But if you are a logical, rational person, ask yourself.

7. Proper guard? In case you have forgotten, this was a war-zone on the night
of the 25th. If police/RAB could be sent in to guard the Kote, the crisis would have been
solved by then

8. Ha ha ha indeed. First, come up with an electrician who knows where the switches were (remember: there were 22 different main switches).
Then you convince him to go inside among thousands of people with loaded weapons. Then lets deal with convincing the BDRs.

You are seriously not suggesting they were just going to agree to someone coming in and turning on the lights, when they were planning to flee under cover of darkness? Given what we know about officers still afraid to go back to their command posts, the electrician would have been very brave (or foolish) indeed. Are you still laughing?

9. Yes–Inexcusable. This is something both investigating committees (Civil and Army) should look into.

10. I agree, but for a different reason. Sahara Khatun’s actions are being
questioned, and she can not investigatre herself neutrally. So she can not be in the committee

I guess you were looking at a mirror when you wrote about the empty vessel. Because if you knew how the BDR operates, you would know that the border outposts (BOP) are manned solely by BDR personnel, and commanded by BDR JCOs and NCOs. The Army officers commanding them stay back from the border, and conduct their work via inspections and monitoring. Do you know who I am quoting? The newly appointed DG of BDR. So be careful before you dispute this.

Army officers know the psychology of the BDR Jawans? Really? A rebellion that killed 51 officers, 3 still missing, women murdered.. Army officers are familiar with this psychology? Is this why they are now not willing to join their commands outside Dhaka without additional protection?

Get your facts straight, empty-vessel.

Bangladesh Army is not the largest contributor to UN peace-keeping missions, it is the Pakistan Army. Bangladesh is 2nd. The difference is small, but when you accuse others of inaccuracy, it is important to get your own facts straight first.

Ah.. name-calling. The last resort of the imbecile who can not defend his position with facts or logic.

Our Army officers are still afraid to go back to their posts outside Dhaka without additional Army soldiers for protection.

Let me see if I get this right. I said civilians in other districts may have been killed if Pilkhana was attacked. You disagreed. Now Army officers are saying they are worried about their own safety. If a trained Army officer who understands the psychology of the troops (your words, not mine) is afraid, and another officer reported that BDRs were taking up arms at his duty post, what chance did the unarmed civilian population have?

Are you calling these officers sons of Razakars?

About two thousand BDR soldiers reported at the Headquarter in Pilkhana on Sunday. BDR jawans in uniform claimed that most of them had fled just after the mutiny broke out on Wednesday. Photo- Adnan, DRIK News

There are four major charges being leveled against the government’s handling of the BDR massacre.

1. The first one is general: The government held back the Army, who otherwise could have prevented or minimized the murders
2. The second one is much more specific. This accuses that after the amnesty was announced, and while Nanak and Sahara Khatun were inside Pilkhana, the majority of the murders happened. From an email allegedly from an Army officer that is being widely circulated:
   

   • RAB arrives at Pilkhana gate at about 10am and ready to move in. Home Ministry said a stubborn “No”.
   • Troops of Mirpur Cantt and Dhaka Cantt arrives at Pilkhana by 11:30am. they seek permission to go in. Again a big “No”
   • Innocent Media people, bluffed by the BDR jawans, focus to the nation the good side or the “right cause” of rebellion BDR. they ask for BCS officers….!!!
   • Govt sends nanok and others and they enter courageously into BDR Pilkhana and safely come back and they are not held hostage.
   • At 4:30pm, army tanks are ready to go in, briefing done, again a big “No”. The army is told to go 3 km away from Pilkhana.
   • Night comes. sahara and nanok enter BDR and all lights are off. sahara visits families of army officers without nanok as seen on TV channels through BTV footage. She does not; we repeat DOES NOT meet any army officer of BDR.
   • Media people telecast live sound of firing from inside Pilkhana when sahara is inside.
   • Sahara comes out and faces the media. some channel representative asks her “Apni jokhon vitorey chilen, amra goolir shobdo shunlam, apni shunen ni?” she say “No. I did not hear any firing”. sahara did not mention anything about the 168 officers inside, nor the media asked her where were the officers.
   • THIS WAS BECAUSE AT THAT TIME BDR WAS COMPLETING THE TOTAL KILLING OF ALIVE OFFICERS AND THIER FAMILIES UNDER THE EYES OF NANOK AND MASS GRAVES WERE BEING PREPARED. Please refer to the Ntv exclusive with major Mokarram on 28th evening. He said that he heard the voice of home minister entering into the kote when BDR gunmen surrounded him.
   • IG police freely moved in because his daughter and son in law capt haider was inside. He ensured the rescue of his daughter, married 82 days earlier.
   • only police is allowed to enter pilkhana and throughout the night they find only 7 dead bodies and suggest that search could not be done due to darkness.
   

3. The third charge is grave. The same email states that ambulances entered Pilkhaka and took away some killers under the guise of removing the injured. From the same email:
   

   • NON-MILITARY AMBULANCES ENTER AND LEAVE PILKHANA A NUMBER OF TIMES AND TAKES AWAY SO MANY DEAD BODIES…BUT THE TOTAL STILL REMAINS 7. Only 5-7 other bodies appear from canal behind BDR naturally floating. IT WAS BECAUSE THOSE AMBULANCES TOOK ABOUT 32 KILLERS AWAY.

4. The fourth accusation is absolutely incendiary. It charges that Sahara Khatun let the murderers go, and that under the direction of the Home Ministry, the power was cut off in the area during the night of Feb 26 so the BDRs could escape. From someone whose father is a senior retired army officer, and who has may family members in the armed services:
   

   Majority of them knew this was going to happen but Home Ministry allowed them to shut the light in BDR and allowed them to escape

All of these accusations were expressed in various forms when Sheikh Hasina met with Army officers on March 1. One survivor from the massacre specifically mentioned that if Sahara Khatun went to the Quarter Guard and asked about the women, then they would not have faced any abuse. In a chaotic scene, the officers accused that the killers were allowed to escape in the name of negotiations, and demanded the resignation of Mirza Azam, Nanak and Sahara Khatun

Let’s examine these charges.

1. To start with, the outcome of an Army-BDR firefight is known–the Army would have won in the long run. But at what cost? If the author of this email, and others bemoaning this fact truly believe the BDR would have fled in the face of an assault, perhaps they have forgotten that BDR is the most battle-hardened force in Bangladesh that faces regular live fire from BSF, while for most army soldiers the only gunfire they see come during exercises.

Yes, the Army has superior heavy weapons, including tanks and helicopter gunships. But lets not forget the civilians, family members and officers still alive who were inside Pilkhana, who would have been used as human shielf. Even the author of the email is claiming most of the officers were still alive. What would have happened to them in the cross-fire if the Army attacked? What of the Army soldiers taking part in the attack?

What about the civilians outside Pilkhana? What about the BDR forces in other districts and the border, where the tensions were rising and reports of rebellion was rising? In the event of an assault, who would have prevented bloodbaths in those locations? We submit that however painful the death of the officers in Dhaka, an armed assult on Pilkhana would have been many times worse and caused a country-wide firefight.

A retired Brig gen and a former DDG of the BDR agrees. Note that this person is intimately familiar with the capability and mentality of the BDR.

Sheikh Hasina essentially reiterated the same points, and for the first time she mentioned that she had asked the Army chief how long it will take to launch an air or ground assult. By the time they had leared that the officers were dead, and decided to take the route of negotiations in order to protect the families.

2. If that is so, then why are there any officers alive at all? We are not talking about the officers who were hiding; we are talking about the officers who were confided by armed BDR personnel at quarter-guard or other locations, at least 18 of whom were released on Day 2 (see our timeline, Feb 26, 4:30 PM). The only explanation that makes sense is that most of the murders had happened in an initial burst in the beginning. Lt Col. Shams, who escaped out of the Darbar hall and was hidden by some BDR soldiers, tells us:

“It was between 10:30 am to 11:00 am and I assume most of the officers were killed during that time,” he said in the interview.

He is also the officer who described the mysterious grey pick-up entering through gate 5, bearing arms and ammunication

3. We know Red-Cross/Red-Crescent ambulances evacuated some of the injured, and those ambulences went to CMH with the injured and the dead. If the author of this email is claiming that the killers went to CMH and escaped, he has access to information that we don’t.

4. We now know this: the main lights in the Pilkhana are not on a timer; they have to be turned on manually via various main switches by an electrician. Because of the firefight, there was no electrician in Pilkhana, hence there were no lights on the streets and perimeter.

We agree that it was short-sighted of the home ministry to not arrange for flood lights. At the very least, just turning on the headlights of all the army and police vehicles would have provided some light. But to accuse a person who risked her own life to go in and bring out families of the army officers of aiding and abetting criminals is reprehensible. Perhaps before leveling such charges, they should talk to Lt. Col. Kamruzzaman, who acknowledged that his wife and children were extracted by Sahara Khatun

For the investigation committee:

Now, emotions are raging inside the serving and retired officers of the Armed forces, and Bangladesh once again stands on the brink of a precipice. So allow us to ask some of our own questions, and point out some other facts that we hope the investigatin committee will examine.

1. What were the various intelligence agencies doing? Lt. Col. Kamruzzaman is on record that the field agents of the intelligence agencies were involved in this. Even if this is not true, this indicates a massive intelligence failure, and we need to see some accountability from the people who head up these agencies

2. What happens to the corruption allegations? We hope that those will not be buried along with the dead bodies. If there is a systematic corruption, let us uproot at as well. And if there was no corrpution, then let the investigations clear the names of the deceased.

3. On March 1, 2009, the police forces of Bangladesh suddenly started receiving 100% ration, which was one of the 22 demands of the BDR. Was there any credible intelligence regarding a similar threat at the Police force? If so, from whom?

Lastly, we end this post with a call for patience from all quarters. The sad truth is, Bangladesh has lost some brave men. But this is not the first time this has happened, and every time the killers walked away free.

The Army is bringing great pressure on the prime minister. We understand their anger and outrage.

But asking for resignations from MPs and ministers, people who risked their lives to save Army officers and their families serves what purpose? Who gains by removing the people withouth whose involvement the death-toll would have been higher? (We hope we have already laid to rest the wisdom of an attack on Pilkhana). Instead, the Army should focus its energy on investigating and capturing the masterminds of this murder.

If this results in an Armed uprising and overthrow of the government, then the people who planned this massacre wins.

But we believe the worst of the crisis is over. Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed stated categorically that the Army is under the authority of the elected government, and the PM has faced off 300+ angry, emotional officers for three hours.

If this democratically elected government can withstand the pressure to act hastily, we believe the truth will shine through. And onlt then the death of the officers will not be in vain.

—-

J @ Shada Kalo [http://shadakalo.blogspot.com] writes using a pseudonym and is best known for exposing government, military, corporate foul plays through whistle-blowing investigative reports.

In any war, the first casualty is always the truth, and it is happening in Bangladesh right now. We believe truth and justice are the best ways to show respect to the memories of the dead, so let us go back and try to do that.

We start with a timeline of the incidents. Please note that this is not a blow-by-blow account but the major points. While this timeline can, and is, self-standing, it is also an integral part of our next article, Accountability and Distorted Truths.

Feb 25 09:30 AM – 10:30 AM:

(Lt. Col. Syed Kamruzzaman’s interview, partial screen-shot below).
Mar. Gen. Shakil Ahmed, DDG Brig. Gen. Bari, Col. Anisuzzaman, Col. Emdad, Col. Zahid, Col. Moshiur, Capt. Mazhar and possibly Capt. Tanvir shot and killed. (10:30 is an assumption. The incidents Col. Kamruzzaman described probably ended before 10:30 AM)

Major Monir describes a slightly different timeline, but that the major points are the same, and the differences are understandable in the fog of war.

Feb 25 between 9:30 AM – 12:00 noon

Various civilians injured or killed by gunfire or splinters from mortar as far as Dhaka university.

Army units take position near New Market around 11:20 AM, and attempts to enter gate 3, but retreated after stiff resistance and massive fire from BDR

Feb 25 around 2:30 PM

Bodies of Dhaka Sector commander Col. Syed Mujibul Haque and 36 Rifle Battalion commanding officer Lt. Col. Enayet’s dead body was discovered near the Nababganj drainage canals (the drain runs under Pilkhana). One of the dead bodies had a letter from presumably the BDR soldiers that asked that the message be sent to all media that they have been oppressed by army officers, and their backs were against the wall.

Prior to that, BDR issued ultimatums that if the Army came into Pilkhana, there would be massive bloodshed. They also demanded that the Army helicopters be moved away.

Prothom Alo reported that the some of the BDRs were asked about the status of the DG around 2:30 PM, and they reported that he, as well as another 150 officers were under arrest. We now know that to be untrue.

Feb 25 2:45 PM – 3:30 PM

Jahangir Nanak and Mirza Azam enter pilkhana after some negotiation via mobile phones and through TV channels. MPs Waserat Hossain and Mahbub Ara Guini statys outside the gate. 14 BDR personnel, including Deputy Assistant Director Touhidul Islam, goes to the PM’s residence for a meeting. (this is the same Touhid Lt. Col. Kamruzzaman said saved his life)

LGED State Minister Jahangir Kabir Nanak offering negotiation options to the BDR rebels. Photo - Amdadul Huq, DRIK News

Feb 25 approx 4:00 PM

A BDR solider announced on a loudspeaker that they will give their life but will not compromise on their demands. This was on Moneshwar Road, about 200 yards from the Darbar hall, where the killings started. Civilians present there clapped and cheered at that statement.

Prothom Alo reported that while all other gates were covered by the Army, this gate had no Army presence.

Feb 25 approx 6:00 PM

Prime minister Sheikh Hasina announces general amnesty. Before this, she met with the 14-member BDR team from 3:45 – 5:45 PM

Feb 25 7:30 PM

As a result of the amnesty announcement, firing stops briefly. Many injured, including women and children come out of the BDR headquarters.

Feb 25 9:00 -11:00 PM

12 BDR members in meeting with negotiators at Ambala Inn in Dhanmondi. They demand that army personnel be withdrawn from Pilkhana as precondition for laying down arms. Army units start moving back by 10:40 PM.

Feb 26 12:10 AM – 6:00 AM

Negotiation meeting ends at 12:10 AM. Sahara Khatun enters Pilkhana at 12:15 AM

Feb 26 2:30 AM

Sahara Khatun exits Pilkhana with at least one injured officer, and about 40 other family members.

After that, we accelerate our narrative:

Feb 26, 9:45 AM

Agriculture miniter Motia Chowdhury and State minister for Law Qumrul Islam meets with 10 rebels again at Ambala Inn.

Feb 26, 11:45 AM

PM meets with the three service chiefs

Feb 26, 1:45 PM

Another team lead by Abdul Jalil meets with the rebels. Rashed Khan Menon asks the rebels to let the family members go, and if necessary keep the politicians as hostage Between 50-60 family members were released after that

Feb 26, 3:20 PM

Afran, daughter of a Major Zia, was released.

Feb 26, 4:20 PM

BTV camera men invited inside to witness and record the surrender of arms.
200 hostages released

Feb 26, 4:30 PM

White flag is raised. 18 injured Army officers were released

Feb 26, 4:30 PM – 6:00 PM

Final stages. Hasina in meeting with the 3 service chiefs.
Surrender and end of mutiny announced at 6 PM

—-

J @ Shada Kalo [http://shadakalo.blogspot.com] writes using a pseudonym and is best known for exposing government, military, corporate foul plays through whistle-blowing investigative reports.